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Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific.
I thank George Thomas (Rutgers Newark) for commenting on a draft of this article.
Special thanks is owed to Kate Bloch (U.C. Hastings), who somehow found the time and
capacity to provide me with extremely helpful remarks regarding—and diplomatic criticisms
of—an earlier draft, all of which she provided immediately before and after giving birth to her
daughter, Julia. I very much appreciate Kate’s willingness to give me her time at such an
important moment in her life. Also, I express my appreciation to Dean Gerald Caplan and
everyone at McGeorge School of Law, who have consistently provided me with the time and
support needed to further my scholarly pursuits.
One final comment: In 1980, just a few years after I joined the academy, I read a thennewly published article by criminal law giant Sanford Kadish, entitled Why Substantive
Criminal Law—A Dialogue, in 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (1980). In the article, Professor Kadish
set out a fictional dialogue between a professor of substantive criminal law and a disgruntled
student, composed of students’ common criticisms of the criminal law course and subject
matter (e.g., “impractical” and “a waste of time,” id. at 2), and Kadish’s “apologia” for
(actually, powerful defense of) what he had been doing in the classroom for several decades.
As a relatively new professor and scholar of substantive criminal law, Kadish’s message
resonated powerfully with me. I made a copy of the article, put it away in my files, have often
looked at it over the years, and have directed a number of my students to read it when they
have expressed many of the same concerns in my classroom. As it turns out, the Kadish article
was the 1980 address he delivered as the eighteenth Cleveland-Marshall Fund Visiting
Scholar. Even at that early time in my career, I appreciated the honor and significance of
giving the Cleveland-Marshall Visiting Scholar Lecture. I could not have imagined in my
fondest fantasies at that time that, two decades later, I would be invited by the faculty of
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law to give the sixty-eighth Cleveland-Marshall Fund Visting
Scholar Lecture, which I did on March 25, 1999. (This article, however, is not the subject of
that address.) I thank everyone, most especially Professor David Goshien, for their kindness
before and during my campus visit in that regard.
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I. ON YINS AND YANGS IN RAPE REFORM
Until not very long ago, American rape2 law unmitigatedly and universally
represented what Susan Estrich aptly described as "boys' rules."3 Indeed, rape law
has been male-oriented at least since Biblical times.4 One does not have to accept
the view that rape law was devised for the misogynistic purpose of “embodying and
ensuring male control over women’s sexuality,”5 to agree with the assertion that the
common law approach to the offense—a crime which by definition deals with male
conduct in relation to females6—was male-centered. After all, the law of rape
developed during a time when women played no role in legal affairs, even as to
offenses that affected them intimately.
Boys' rules have certainly not been eradicated everywhere and in every case, but
feminists can take legitimate pride in the fact that rape law has undergone significant
reform in just the past decade or two, largely as a result of their efforts.7 The thesis
2

Some states now characterize the crime of rape as “sexual assault,” e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:14-2c(1) (1995), or “criminal sexual conduct,” e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b
(West 1991). The reasons for the change in nomenclature is that:
[s]exual assault puts the concept of violence into the word rape. It reflects a
historically recent clinical, political, and social analysis of the phenomenon of rape
that attempts to drain off the toxins of blame-the-victim, and to shift the criterion of
rape from the behavior of the victim to that of the criminal. It is an attempt to take any
ambiguity out of the word rape.
NANCY VENABLE RAINE, AFTER SILENCE: RAPE AND MY JOURNEY BACK 208 (1998).
3

SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 60 (1987).

4

According to Deuteronomy, if a man “takes hold” of “a virgin maiden” and “lies with her
and is discovered,” the wrongdoer must pay fifty shekels of silver to the father, marry the
maiden, and never divorce. Deuteronomy 22:28-29.
5

Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 644 (1983).
6
The common law definition of the crime was gender-specific: nonconsensual sexual
intercourse by a male with a female not his wife. Some states now define the offense in
gender-neutral terms. See e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.250b (West 1991) (“A person
is guilty . . . if he or she engages in sexual penetration with another person . . .”). For
purposes of clarity, however, and in order to deal with the statistically most common scenario,
I intend to focus here on heterosexual rape, and to assume that the aggressor is a male, and the
victim is a female.
7

I do not want to overstate the case of reform. Rape law (which itself has not advanced
uniformly among the states) has progressed further than public attitudes about the offense,
particularly in the acquaintance rape area. One need only read newspaper stories, listen to
“talk radio,” or converse with police officers, jurors, and others to come to the unhappy view
that cultural attitudes regarding sexual relations change very slowly. See David P. Bryden &
Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194,
1379 (1997) (“There is a great deal of anecdotal and social-scientific evidence of public (and
jury) bias against norm-violating victims of acquaintance rape.”). However, bias against
female victims of acquaintance rape has declined in recent years, resulting in juries “at least
somewhat more sympathetic to the prosecution” in such cases. Id. at 1379-80.
Justice Harlan wisely wrote that “it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as
mirror and reflect.” United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
It is necessary and appropriate, therefore, for legislatures and courts to seek to change public
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of my comments here is that although additional legal reform is in order,8 the time
may also be right for us to concern ourselves at least a little with the possibility that
rape reform could go (or perhaps is going) down some other paths that fair-minded
persons will later regret. Just a few decades ago, rape law was so irrational and
insensitive to the legitimate interests of women that there was really no need to strike
a balance: virtually any reform effort was likely to result in improvement. But, we
are past that extreme stage. It is worthwhile now, I think, to pause for a moment,
take stock of the reforms that have been implemented and the ones that remain to be
realized, and make sure that our efforts to provide justice to rape victims do not
result in unfairness to those who might be accused of this heinous offense.9
Is there really a risk that rape law reform will go too far? At first blush, my
concern seems silly. After all, men still retain disproportionate lawmaking power,
and whatever the law may compel, juries can ignore reforms, as they do on occasion.
In my view, however, there is not an insignificant risk of expanding rape law too far
in certain regards.
Let me explain. Consider for a moment a political lesson from the Oklahoma
City bombing case. After that horrendous incident, President Bill Clinton moved
quickly to demand legislation expanding the Government’s authority to monitor and
infiltrate organizations it suspects of terrorism.10 The President took the position
normally reserved for political conservatives who made similar (I believe unwise)
calls for expanded police powers during the McCarthy, civil rights, and Vietnam
War eras. But, as Clinton sought to diminish citizens’ civil liberties, lo and behold,
opposition to the anti-terrorist measure came from not only an expected (but
ordinarily politically weak) source, the American Civil Liberties Union, but also
from an unexpected one—from conservative Republicans who warned about
expanded federal police power.11 Although Senator Orrin Hatch suggested that this
turn-around had long-term implications,12 these Republicans did not suddenly get
“A.C.L.U. religion.” Instead, conservatives opposed Clinton’s proposed legislation
because they feared that if the Government were given a free rein to conduct
surveillance of militia groups, they might also infiltrate the National Rifle
Association and other political enemies of the left and friends of the right. So, in the
Oklahoma City situation, although the political left and right traded sides, the
attitudes through the law. Of course, if the law gets too far ahead of public attitudes, the risk
of jury nullification increases, a matter of particular concern in the rape context.
8

See infra text accompanying notes 105-06, 154-65.

9
See Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315, 336 (D.C. 1990) (Schwelb, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he end does not justify the means. Our commitment to
eradicating past and present wrongs [in the law of rape] may not be permitted to dilute our
determination that all defendants, including those charged with sexual offenses, receive the
fair trial which is their constitutional due.”).
10

John F. Harris, Clinton Lashes Out At Terrorists, Seeks Expanded Powers, WASH. POST,
Apr. 24, 1995, at A1.
11
Christopher Hanson, Terrorist Bill Vote Shows New Lineup on Law and Order, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 19, 1996, at A1.
12

“The world is turning around. When I got here . . . the conservatives wanted to increase
wiretaps and the liberals didn’t.” Id.
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political system had its usual “yin and yang,”13 the usual competing, tugging forces.
The adversarial system was at work in Congress.
One would naturally expect the same yin and yang to work in rape law reform.
After all, we still have Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives,
advocates of civil liberties and proponents of unfettered law enforcement, and men
and women, all with potentially competing interests at stake.14 But, the rape reform
movement has not followed the expected course. Many of the usual supporters of
civil liberties and the rights of criminal suspects have been in the political bed with
their usual enemies. Many feminists—who typically favor the interests of
underdogs, which include, of course, people accused of crime—have allied
themselves with political conservatives. Feminists seek to abolish “boys’ rules” to
sexual relations; political conservatives seek to strengthen the powers of police and
prosecutors and to increase the punishment of wrongdoers.15 Strange bedfellows like
this can produce unwanted offspring. And, when we add a third, very powerful
political force, the “victims’ rights movement,” there is a more-than-ordinary risk
that, unless we are cautious, rape law may take some wrong paths, for who will be
there to resist the wrong turns that are taken?
Therefore, I urge a thoughtful and reasoned look at where we have been in rape
law and where we may be going. The goal should ultimately be to strike a sensible
13

According to one Chinese school of thought, there are:
two cosmic forces, one yin. . . which is negative, passive, weak, and disintegrative,
and the other yang. . ., which is positive, active, strong, and integrative. All things are
produced through the interaction of the two. . . . Wherever harmony is sought or
change takes place, the forces of yin and yang are at work . . . .
Wing-Tsit Chan, Chinese Philosophy in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 87, 89 (Paul
Edwards, ed., 1967).
14
I find it disquieting to realize that many persons assume that men and women, solely
because of their gender, inevitably are on opposite sides of the rape reform movement.
Presumably, the basis for such a view is that women constitute the potential victims of rape,
and men are the potential predators. Even if one accepts this cynical view of the world, the
more accurate way to characterize the “battle lines” is between those who fear sexual violation
of themselves or those close to them and those who do not. This description would put
virtually all females and some males together in battle against males predators and those who
simply “don’t get it.”
On the “they don’t get it” subject, it is certainly true that, although humans have the
capacity to feel empathy, no one can completely understand what one has not experienced. In
my case, thankfully, neither I nor any loved one of mine has been raped. Therefore, I come to
this subject as an “outsider” who sought through reading and conversation to understand the
effects of the crime on its victims. In this regard I am persuaded by those who argue that it is
not enough to say, simply, that rape is a grievous crime. Just as a person can rationally believe
that physical pain from disease is so severe, and the resulting loss of dignity so great, that
death is preferable to life, I accept the proposition of some persons that it is not irrational to
believe that, in some cases, rape can result in psychological death—a form of “spiritual
murder,” Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 1448 (1993), or “soul-murder,” Lynne Henderson, Rape and
Responsibility, 11 LAW & PHILOSOPHY 127, 164 (1992).
15
Others have noted the intriguing alliance between political conservatives and feminists.
See e.g., Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory
Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 31 (1994).
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balance. We should not give up the gains in rape reform and, indeed, should go
further in some regards, but we should move with considerable caution.
II. INITIAL PREMISES: A PERSONAL DISCLAIMER
Rape is an especially sensitive subject. It presents unique problems to teach,16
and it is a difficult topic about which to write without trepidation, particularly if the
author intends to question any present-day conventional wisdom on the subject.
Therefore, so fair-minded readers will not misconstrue my views, let me set out the
premises supporting my analysis.17
First, I believe that rape can cause such devastating psychological harm that it is
not irrational for a legislature (death penalty issues aside) to treat rape and murder as
offenses of essentially equivalent gravity.18 Second, I accept wholeheartedly the
view that for centuries rape law, including the way rape victims were treated in the
criminal justice system, was profoundly unwise and unjust.
But, third, I also endorse the view that, although crime control concerns
sometimes make the Constitution “and the values it represents . . . appear unrealistic
or ‘extravagant’ to some,”19 constitutional rights—including, but not limited to, the
“bedrock . . . principle”20 of presumption of innocence and, if you will, basic
fairness—must not be impaired as a result of efforts to “fight crime” generally or
“stop rape” specifically. Constitutional rights are not absolute, of course. But, in
balancing law enforcement needs against constitutional rights, in the close cases I
will come down on the side of the Constitution and on the side of protecting the
accused, even at the risk of releasing some guilty persons.21
16

For excellent discussion of the teaching problems and potential solutions, see Kate E.
Bloch, A Rape Law Pedagogy, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307 (1995); Susan Estrich, Teaching
Rape Law, 102 YALE L.J. 481 (1992); James J. Tomkovicz, On Teaching Rape: Reasons,
Risks, and Rewards, 102 YALE L.J. 481 (1992).
17
I am conflicted by my decision to set out the premises. Professor Stephen Carter has
written about intellectuals that it is:
the responsibility of the intellectual . . . to try not to worry about whether one’s views
are, in someone else’s judgment, the proper ones . . . . What makes one an intellectual
is the drive to learn, to question, to understand, to criticize, not as a means to an end
but as an end in itself.
STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 6 (1991).
Those of us in academia have the luxury and responsibility to reflect on the law and to
search for “truths.” It may later prove to be the case that, in my search for the “truth” of rape
reform, I have taken an incorrect path. If so, it won’t be the first time. But, we do not satisfy
our responsibilities if we simply accept conventional wisdom in any regard. We must always
be skeptics.
18

See supra note 14.

19

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).

20

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).

21

See also id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“In a criminal case, . . . we do not view the
social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting
someone who is guilty . . . . [T]he requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a
criminal case [is] bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”).
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Fourth, constitutional principles aside, men and women both have responsibilities
in preventing rape. Traditional rape law put the onus on women to prevent their own
rape;22 reformers have rightly sought to put an increasing burden on men. But, the
law should avoid inadvertently treating women as passive parties in sexual
encounters. They have as much responsibility to express their feelings about
intimacy as the male has the duty to make reasonable efforts to learn a female's
wishes.
Fifth, in a liberal society that values individual freedom, we should not use the
sledge hammer of the criminal law to punish every form of wrongdoing that exists in
society. I deplore the tendency of legislators and the public to respond reflexively to
perceived wrongdoing by criminalizing conduct without first determining whether
the problem justifies such a result. Lying may be morally wrong, but not all lying is
or should be criminal. It may be wrong to stand by and allow harm to come to
others when we could easily prevent it, but generally it is no crime to do so.23 And,
it should follow that there is nothing inconsistent with the assertion that some forms
of sexual misconduct do not justify the criminal sanction and are more properly
handled through tort law,24 mediation,25 or other non-criminal approaches.
I am a traditionalist in the belief that “[w]hat distinguishes a criminal from a civil
sanction and all that distinguishes it, . . . is the judgment of community
condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”26 For present
purposes this means that felony liability is unjust in the absence of very serious
wrongdoing and moral culpability in committing the wrongdoing. A criminal
conviction is inappropriate if the community, ordinarily represented by the jury,27
22

See infra text accompanying notes 40-49.

23

JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 9.06 (2d ed. 1995).

24

See e.g., Nora West, Note, Rape in the Criminal Law and the Victim’s Tort Alternative:
A Feminist Analysis, 50 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 96 (1992).
25
E.g., Deborah Gartzke Goolsby, Note, Using Mediation in Cases of Simple Rape, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1183 (1990).
26

Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
404 (1958).
27

Professor Kate Bloch, who read an earlier draft of this article, wrote me that “one
underlying premise of [your] article is an enormous faith in the ability of juries to render fair
verdicts, despite some still prevalent rape myths.” Letter from Kate Bloch to Author, dated
(Jan. 14, 1999) (in author’s possession). As indicated earlier, see supra note 7, I am aware
that the law is presently more progressive than public attitudes about rape, and this means that
juries sometimes fail to convict in circumstances in which I and others can only shake our
heads in disbelief and shock.
Juries fail to convict, even when others believe proof of guilt is great, for many reasons,
including poor lawyering, juror prejudice or ignorance, or reasonable doubt about guilt. An
acquittal may also represent the jurors’ moral sense that the law is out of touch with
community values. Sometimes, “[t]he pages of history shine on instances of the jury’s
exercise of its prerogative to disregard uncontradicted evidence and instructions of the judge,”
but other times jury nullification does not seem so benevolent. United States v. Dougherty,
473 F.2d 1113, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
So, do I trust juries? Yes, I do trust in juries, for a simple reason. Since I believe that a
criminal conviction does and should express the community’s condemnation of the actor, it
follows that a jury, if fairly selected, is better equipped than a judge to determine whether the
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does not believe that the misconduct justifies “a formal and solemn pronouncement
of the moral condemnation of the community.”28
Finally, and probably least controversially, when the criminal law is properly
invoked, offenses should be graded sensibly. We should save the most severe
penalties for the most serious forms of wrongdoing. Even if the constitutional
doctrine of proportional punishment is now largely lifeless outside the death penalty
context,29 the basic principle that punishment should be roughly proportioned to the
offense committed deserves our continued respect. This means that an act that
causes less harm or involves less personal moral turpitude than another should be
punished less severely. Not all forms of sexual misconduct—even those that justify
the criminal sanction—deserve the label “rape” and the severe sanctions that should
follow from a conviction for that offense.
III. PRE-REFORM RAPE LAW: THE “BAD OLD DAYS”
To appreciate how far we have come, and in order to determine where we should
go from here, it is essential to understand pre-reform rape law and what may truly be
called “the bad old days” of rape law.
Until recent years, state laws, by statute and judicial interpretation, often stacked
the law against women who asserted that they had been raped.30 On the procedural
accused’s conduct (if proven) justifies the community’s approbation. See Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (“If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment
of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was
to have it.”). Since punishment is imposed in the community’s—our—name, I prefer to have
ordinary persons, and not the elite, speak for me, for better or for worse. And, sometimes it
will be for the worse in an individual case. But, there are also many examples in history of
bizarre or incomprehensible judicial verdicts, rulings and comments from the bench.
My trust is not blind. Few would argue with the proposition that current jury selection
procedures are flawed, although the suggested remedies vary. The institutional remedy for
these flaws is not to reduce the influence of juries, but rather is to improve jury selection
procedures (and, specifically in the rape context, to educate the community—the future
jurors—regarding rape myths). In some circumstances, judges should also be prepared to
tailor special jury instructions to mitigate the risk of juror prejudice. Cf., Joshua Dressler,
When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual
Advances, and the “Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 760-61
(1995) (proposing jury instructions intended to reduce the risk of homophobic jury verdicts in
criminal homicide cases in which the victim was gay). Ultimately, however, juries fail us for
the same reason that all institutions disappoint us on occasion (or more often than that):
because human beings are fallible.
So, again, do I trust juries? I trust in juries. If we don’t trust in them, then I do not know
where else we can turn.
28

Hart, supra note 26, at 405.

29

See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (two Justices stating that there is no
constitutional proportionality requirement in non-capital offenses; three Justices stating that
any term of imprisonment is permissible for a serious offense).
30
Some of the greatest injustices to rape victims occur prior to trial. Police officers and
prosecutors have frequently treated rape victims with scorn, questioned their allegations, and
even suggested that they were responsible for their fate. E.g., VERNON R. WIEHE & ANN L.
RICHARDS, INTIMATE BETRAYAL: UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO THE TRAUMA OF
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 32 (1995) (reporting that one officer told a rape victim that “[u]sually if
women are out at this time of night, it was their fault”). Of course, these official attitudes
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side, various rules reduced the likelihood of prosecutorial success in rape trials.
First, some states, following the lead of the Model Penal Code, barred rape
prosecutions if the female did not notify public authorities within a brief period of
time after her assault.31
Second, in rape prosecutions in which consent was an issue, judges sometimes
warned jurors that a rape charge “is easily made and once made, difficult to defend
against even if the person accused is innocent.”32 Juries were admonished “to
examine the testimony” of the complainant “with caution”33 and to evaluate the
complainant's testimony with special care, "in view of the emotional involvement of
the witness and the difficulty of determining the truth with respect to alleged sexual
activities carried out in private."34 Third, some states required corroboration of the
complainant's accusation,35 although such a rule was not required for other
offenses.36
Fourth, defense lawyers cross-examined rape complainants, and often introduced
third-party testimony relating to the complainant’s consensual sexual activities with
other persons. The purposes of such questioning and testimony were to humiliate
and degrade the complainant, to prove her unchastity as a means of casting doubt on
her truthfulness regarding her complaint, and to allow jurors sub rosa to characterize
the female as a sexually promiscuous person undeserving of the law's protection.
Perhaps this aspect of rape trials, more than anything else, deterred women from
making truthful accusations of rape.
The substance of rape law—the focus of this article—was also weighted against
women. Although it is often said that common law rape consisted of “unlawful
sexual intercourse with a female person without her consent,”37 Blackstone described
the crime as “carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will.”38 That is,
typically mirror community beliefs. See RAINE, supra note 2, at 224-25 (reporting a 1988
Rhode Island Crisis Center survey of 1,700 sixth- to ninth-grade students of both sexes, in
which about half of the respondents said that a woman who walks alone at night in “seductive”
clothing is “asking to be raped”). These abuses fall outside the scope of this article, which
focuses on substantive rape law and not on pre-trial and trial procedures.
31

See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4) (1985) (requiring notice to authorities by a
rape victim within three months of the offense; with females under the age of 16, requiring
notice within three months after a parent or guardian learned of the offense); 2 American Law
Institute, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Comment to § 213.6 at 421 (1980) (citing
eight jurisdictions with notice requirements).
32

See, e.g., State v. Bashaw, 672 P.2d 48 (Or. 1983).

33

Id. (disapproving of the jury instruction).

34

E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 (5) (1985).

35

Id.

36

Although the corroboration requirement did not exist at common law, “its history in
American jurisdictions is long and varied.” 2 American Law Institute, MODEL PENAL CODE
AND COMMENTARIES, Comment to § 213.6 at 422 (1980).
37

ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 197 (3d ed. 1982).

38

4 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
(emphasis added).
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it was not enough that the woman did not consent to the intercourse; the intercourse
had to be forcible.39
The force requirement led to an odd and dangerous principle, the resistance
requirement. A woman had to physically resist her attacker, often “to the utmost.”40
If she did not resist sufficiently, a rape conviction would not stand. The only time
resistance was not required was when the aggressor used or threatened deadly force.
In other words, if the male used moderate force to attempt intercourse, the victim
was expected to resist him and, thus, demonstrate to the man (and the jury?) that the
intercourse was against her will.41 The effect of this rule, of course, was to enhance
the possibility that the male would escalate his violence to overcome her resistance
and, in the process, aggravate the physical injuries to the woman.42 It is this rule,
most of all, that inspired Professor Estrich’s observation that rape law played by
“boys’ rules”: “The reasonable woman, it seems, is not a school boy ‘sissy.’ She is
a real man.”43
A classic example of pre-reform rape law is State v. Alston.44 The complainant,
Cottie Brown, lived with Alston in what the court oddly characterized as a
relationship in which “consensual sexual relations [at times] involved some
violence.”45 As a result of Alston’s physical abuse of Brown, she occasionally left
Alston, only to return. During this period, Brown frequently acceded to Alston's
demands for sexual intercourse, even when she did not want relations. She testified
that she would undress without complaint, and lie passively while he had intercourse.
At the time of the alleged rape, Brown was living with her mother. Alston called
her to demand that she return to him. Later the next day, he accosted her on a street,
put his hand on her, and warned her that he would “fix” her face “so that her mother
could see he was not ‘playing’.”46 He escorted her to a friend's house, where they
had frequently had sex together before, and where she again passively allowed him
to have intercourse.
39

State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470, 475 (N.C. 1984).

40

Starr v. State, 237 N.W. 96, 97 (Wis. 1931).

41

The resistance requirement also demonstrated that the victim “merited” the law’s
protection. See State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 733 (Md. 1981) (Cole, J., dissenting) (requiring
the woman to “follow the natural instinct of every proud female to resist, by more than mere
words, the violation of her person by a stranger or an unwelcome friend. She must make it
plain that she regards such sexual acts as abhorrent and repugnant to her natural sense of
pride.”).
42

See CAROLINE W. HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME
11 (1991) (reporting that women who resisted were less likely to be victims of completed rape,
but more likely to be injured, than those who took no self-protective measures); but see
Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 981 (citing
various studies, concluding that “[d]espite popular mythology, a woman’s physical resistance
to a sexual aggressor decreases her chance of being raped and does not increase her risk for
serious bodily injury or death”).
43

Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1114 (1986).

44

312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984).

45

Id. at 471.

46

Id. at 472.
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The jury convicted Alston of forcible rape, but the North Carolina Supreme Court
reversed his conviction. It held that although Brown did not consent to the
intercourse, there was no evidence that Alston used physical force—that is, force
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury—to secure intercourse with her, nor did
he threaten her with such force.
What about the fact that Alston had abused Brown in the past and threatened that
day to “fix” her face? Remarkably, the court discounted all of this. In a wholly
unrealistic example of narrow time-framing and psychological naivete, the court
stated that Alston’s prior use of force and his “fix your face” threat were “unrelated”
to the act of sexual intercourse on that day. To the Alston court, it seems, prior acts
of force and current threats not directly linked to a demand for sexual intercourse are
causally irrelevant; it is as if they do not act upon the psyche of a victim. In the
absence of legally recognized force, therefore, Brown had to physically resist Alston,
which she did not. In effect, because Brown did not make clear that Alston's acts
were “abhorrent and repugnant to her natural sense of pride,"47 he was set free.
Alston says it all. Under the “old view” of rape, a few exceptions aside,48 “mere”
nonconsensual intercourse did not constitute a crime.49 The prosecution had to prove
either that the male used or threatened to use serious physical force, on the present
occasion, for the purpose of securing intercourse, or that the female resisted him to
the utmost. Thus, the traditional version of the crime was exceedingly narrow, and
the resistance rule arguably enhanced the risk of additional serious harm to the
victim. When we include the procedural barriers to conviction, it is evident that rape
law needed serious reform.
IV. FORCIBLE RAPE: THE CHANGES (SOME GOOD, SOME NOT)
A. Actus Reus
Substantive rape law has changed, much of it for the good, but some of it
troubling.50 The primary change in the law of forcible rape pertains to the concept of

47

See supra note 41.

48

I am putting aside so-called statutory rape (sexual intercourse with an underage female).
On rare occasion, rape could also be proved on the basis of fraud. See infra Part V.
49
Fornication was a misdemeanor offense in a very few jurisdictions. PERKINS & BOYCE,
supra note 37, at 455.
50

On the procedural side, the single most significant change has been the passage in nearly
all states of so-called “rape shield” laws. These laws restrict, in varying degrees, the right of
defense attorneys to cross-examine complainants and to call witnesses to testify regarding the
complainant’s prior sexual behavior and reputation. See Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape
Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV.
763, 905 (1985) (summarizing various models of rape-shield statutes). The proportion of rape
victims who report the crime has seemingly increased since the enactment of rape-shield laws
and other procedural reforms. Some scholars have hypothesized that this rise in crime
reporting is more associated with changes in public attitudes about the crime, inspired by the
women’s movement, than is associated with the legal reforms themselves. Bryden &
Lengnick, supra note 7, at 1378. Other researchers believe that the reforms themselves have
prompted the increased willingness of women to report their victimization, at least in
acquaintance rapes cases. Cassia C. Spohn & Julie Horney, The Impact of Rape Reform Law
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force. First, the good news. Some states have abolished the resistance requirement
outright.51 Other states no longer require the woman to resist “to the utmost,” and
only demand that her resistance be reasonable under the circumstances.52 And, even
here, the resistance requirement may be less real than it seems. Remember that a
woman is not required to resist if the male uses or threatens to use serious force.
And, in perhaps the most significant change in judicial attitudes, courts are becoming
more realistic in their conception of force.
Consider here State v. Rusk.53 The victim agreed to drive Rusk, whom she had
met that evening in a bar, to his rooming house. When they arrived, at night, he tried
to convince her to come up to his place. When she refused, he took the keys out of
the ignition, and asked “Now will you come up?”54 She acceded because, as she
testified, she was scared being in an unfamiliar area. When they entered his room,
he went to the bathroom for a few minutes, but she did not leave or seek help. When
he returned, he sat down on the bed, while she sat in a chair. He turned off the lights
and began to remove her blouse. She took off her slacks because “her [sic] asked me
to do it.”55 She begged him to let her leave, and she testified that she was scared
because of a “look in his eyes.” At one point, she apparently asked him, “If I do
what you want, will you let me go without killing me?”56 He said yes. She also
testified that at one point “he put his hands on my throat and started lightly to choke
me.”57 She did not physically resist Rusk.
Now, how do these facts compare to Alston?58 Which presents a stronger case of
forcible rape? One substantial fact supports the argument that Rusk is the more
compelling case of rape. In Rusk, we have the light choking, whereas no actual force
was used during the commission of the sexual act in Alston.59

on the Processing of Simple and Aggravated Rape Cases, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 861,
882 (1996).
51
E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-17 (West 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS. Ann §
750.520i (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347(2) (West 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §
3107 (West 1983); People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 120, (Cal. 1986) (interpreting statutory
amendments to California’s rape law to mean that “[f]or the first time, the Legislature has
assigned the decision as to whether a sexual assault should be resisted to the realm of personal
choice”).
52
Anderson, supra note 42, at 964-66; Aya Gruber, Pink Elephants in the Rape Trial: The
Problem of Tort-Type Defenses in the Criminal Law of Rape, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
LAW 203, 217 (1997); Mustafa K. Kasubhai, Destabilizing Power in Rape: Why Consent
Theory in Rape Law is Turned On Its Head, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 57-58 n.101 (1996).
53

406 A.2d 624 (Md. 1979), rev’d, 424 A.2d 720 (1981).

54

406 A.2d at 625.

55

Id. at 626.

56

Id. However, at another point she testified that she asked him only “If I do what you
want, will you let me go?” Id.
57

Id.

58

State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984); see also notes 44-47.

59

Does the existence of the prior sexual relationship in Alston, not present in Rusk, make
the latter case a stronger one for conviction? It does in one regard. In view of Cottie Brown’s
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Virtually everything else strikes me as supporting the claim that Alston is the
better case for conviction. First, in Rusk, the Court of Special Appeals inferentially
disparaged the victim when it noted the irrelevant fact that she was “a twenty-one
year old mother of a two-year-old son . . . separated from her husband but not yet
divorced” who had left her son with her mother to go “bar hopping.”60 The implicit
message is that the victim was “asking for trouble,” a precursor to an unfriendly
judicial outcome.61 Second, there is the history of physical abuse in Alston, absent in
Rusk, that should have counted in measuring the victim’s reasonable fear of Alston.
Third, the physical force in Rusk (the “light choke”) could easily have been
characterized by an unfriendly court or jury as ambiguous evidence: one person’s
light choke is another person’s inartful caress. Fourth, Rusk’s victim had the
opportunity to leave the apartment; Alston’s victim could not get away.62 Fifth, in
Alston, there was an explicit threat of physical harm (“fixing” the victim’s face),
whereas Rusk involved only an implicit threat (his yes to her question whether he
would let her go and not kill her if she acceded). Even this “threat” was ambiguous.
It is unclear that his “yes” was intended as a response to a plea not to be killed; it
may have been that he was affirming that he would let her go after the sex.63
It is hard for me to imagine that the Alston court would have upheld a forcible
rape conviction in Rusk. But, the Court of Appeals in Maryland affirmed the rape
conviction. It agreed with the dissent below that a jury could reasonably have found
that Rusk’s conduct was calculated to create in the victim’s mind “a real
apprehension, due to fear, of imminent bodily harm, serious enough to overcome her
will to resist.”64 Thus, the resistance requirement was mooted because the court
applied a less strict—a far more realistic—understanding of physical force.
prior sexual relationship with Alston, the court demanded heightened proof that she did not
consent to the alleged rape.
Where as here the victim has engaged in a prior continuing consensual sexual
relationship with the defendant . . . the State ordinarily will be able to show the
victim’s lack of consent . . . only by evidence of statements or actions by the victim
which were clearly communicated to the defendant and which expressly and
unequivocally indicated the victim’s withdrawal of any prior consent and lack of
consent to the particular act of intercourse.
Id. at 475. The court ruled, however, that there was sufficient evidence of non-consent. Her
case failed for lack of proof of force or resistance.
60
406 A.2d at 625; see also id. at 633 (Wilner, J., dissenting) (criticizing this
characterization for its lack of significance).
61
And, indeed, the Court of Special Appeals overturned Rusk’s conviction, despite the
sharp criticism of the dissent. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, however, reversed this
judgment and affirmed the conviction, “for the fundamental reason so well expressed in the
dissenting opinion” below. State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 727 (1981).
62

The point here is not that this opportunity—the ability to leave the apartment, at night, in
an unknown area, and seek help by foot—was a meaningful one, for it was not. The point is
that, given the unsympathetic treatment rape complainants have come to expect from juries
and courts, the woman’s slight window of opportunity could have been used against her.
63

The victim provided two different accounts of the question she asked Rusk, to which he
answered yes. See supra note 56.
64

406 A.2d at 627 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
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The Alston/Rusk dichotomy cannot be explained on the basis of a trend in rape
law. We are dealing here with two different state courts, and the Rusk decision
actually preceded Alston by three years. But, what we see, I think, is emblematic of
something like the start of a trend in Rusk, and the beginning of the end of the “bad
old days” in Alston. Indeed, the North Carolina Supreme Court has virtually
repudiated its decision in Alston.65 It has since characterized the facts in Alston as
“unique,”66 “peculiar,” and perhaps “sui generis,”67 and it has since affirmed forcible
rape convictions in more ambiguous circumstances.68
A realistic treatment of force, of course, is as it should be. But, a few states are
taking rape reform to another, I believe more questionable, level. Consider the
M.T.S. case.69 A 17-year-old boy, M.T.S., lived in the same house as C.G., a fifteenyear-old girl, and her parents. On the critical night, the two participated in
consensual "kissing and heavy petting."70 Ultimately, intercourse occurred in the
girl's bedroom. C.G. testified that M.T.S. had intercourse with her while she was
asleep. He claimed an entirely consensual enterprise. The court, as trier of fact, “did
not find that C.G. had been sleeping at the time of penetration, but nevertheless
found that she had not consented to the actual sexual act.”71 There was no evidence
that M.T.S. threatened C.G. in any manner, nor did she physically resist his actions.
Nonetheless, the defendant was convicted of forcible rape, according to a statute that,
by it terms, required evidence that the sexual penetration occurred as the result of
“physical force or coercion.”
Now, what is wrong with convicting M.T.S.? There is nothing wrong with
convicting M.T.S. of a crime. If C.G. truly did not consent to the intercourse, as the
judge found,72 she was wronged. Her right of sexual autonomy was violated. But,
let’s put the case in perspective. At an earlier time, in many jurisdictions, if the
teenagers’ sexual activities had been brought to the attention of prosecutors, the

65
In State v. Brown, 420 S.E.2d 147 (N.C. 1992), the state supreme court signaled its wish
to bury the decision entirely by citing and quoting from Susan Estrich, supra note 43,
characterizing it as a “thoughtful article” “which makes strong arguments that the law should
treat such conduct [as occurred in Alston] as ‘force’ . . . or should abandon the element of
force.” Id. at 152.
66

Id. at 151.

67

Id. at 150.

68

In Brown, the defendant entered a hospital room in which the victim was sleeping, pulled
down her bed clothing, felt her abdomen, touched her genital region, and then inserted his
finger in her vagina, and left. The victim awoke when he was feeling her abdomen. Believing
that the defendant was a nurse assessing her condition, the patient did not resist. Confronted
with a rape statute that did not easily encompass this situation, the court found the requisite
force “in pulling back the bedclothing, pulling up the victim’s gown, and pulling her panties
aside.” Id. at 152.
69

New Jersey in re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992).

70

Id. at 1267.

71

Id. at 1269.

72

Every year, I poll students on the case. The vast majority of my students, male and
female—at Wayne State University, McGeorge, and U.C. Berkeley—believe the boy’s story.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998

13

422

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:409

matter would have been handled as a case of statutory rape, and probably treated
leniently given the boy’s age and lack of criminal record.73 But, here the prosecutor
sought to prove forcible rape. This means that C.G.’s behavior—and not her
underage status—was critical. What might have been handled through pre-trial
bargaining (after all, both sides agreed that intercourse with an underage female
occurred, the only viable issue in statutory rape cases), instead resulted in a trial that
put C.G. and her family though embarrassing testimony about “heavy petting” and
must have made C.G.’s experience with the legal system far more harrowing than it
had to be.
But, that is not the worst of it. I return to the statute. It prohibited sexual
intercourse brought about by “physical force or coercion.” No coercion was alleged.
Instead, the prosecutor argued, and the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously
agreed—there was no yang response to the yin—that M.T.S. used physical force to
secure the intercourse. But, wait. What was the physical force? It was, quite
simply, the physical contact inherent in the sexual act itself. In short, every act of
sexual intercourse in New Jersey—inside and outside of marriage—satisfies the
force requirement of forcible rape.74 What distinguishes a Class A felony,
punishable by a term of imprisonment of from 10 to 20 years, from lawful
intercourse is the female's consent or lack thereof. The offense is proven, the court
said, unless the victim gives “affirmative and freely-given permission . . . to the
specific act of penetration.”75
Now, what is wrong with this picture?76 What is wrong, first of all, is that the
court effectively redrafted the statute. The New Jersey statute expressly prohibited
“physical force” and was silent regarding the element of “non-consent.” After
M.T.S., the statute is interpreted as requiring just the act of intercourse itself, in the
73
But, maybe not. In State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759 (R.I. 1998), an 18-year-old male
engaged in consensual intercourse with a 13-year-old female whom he had been “dating.”
The defendant was not permitted to introduce evidence that he reasonably believed she was 16
years old (the age of consent). He was sentenced to the statutory minimum sentence of 20
years imprisonment, with 18 years suspended and probation. The court also ordered Yanez
not to have contact with the female for 20 years, and, as required by law, to register as a
convicted sex offender. The state supreme court upheld the conviction over the strong dissent
of one Justice, who described the punishment as “uncommonly brutal, harsh, and undeserved
. . . that is so out of whack with reality that it is virtually without parallel in any jurisdiction of
the United States.” Id. at 771-72.
74
The New Jersey sexual assault statute applies to married couples as well. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:14-2c (West 1995) (“An actor is guilty of sexual assault if he commits an act of
sexual penetration with another person . . .”) (emphasis added).
75

M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1277.

76

Susan Estrich has written that “if a thief stripped his victim, flattened that victim on the
floor, lay down on top, and took the victim’s wallet or jewelry, few would pause before
concluding forcible robbery.” ESTRICH, supra note 3, at 59. In other words, what M.T.S. did
to C.G., in fact, did constitute “force.” There is a difference, however between Estrich’s
example and the ordinary act of sexual intercourse. The “thief” wants money and can obtain
the money without the use of force. That is why “flattening” the victim converts a thief into a
robber: he has done something that is not an inherent feature of the act of unlawfully taking
property. But, there is no way to have sexual intercourse without the physical contact that
qualifies as force under M.T.S.
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absence of freely-given permission. Even if this is a good result, it certainly is not
what the statute provided. If the New Jersey legislature had intended to punish
simple nonconsensual intercourse, it could (and should) have drafted its statute
accordingly.77
Not only has the court acted as a super-legislature, but by treating sexual
intercourse as “force” it invites disproportional punishment. Can there be any doubt
that forcible nonconsensual sexual intercourse is a worse harm than nonforcible,
nonconsensual intercourse and, therefore, should be punished more severely? Yet,
as interpreted, the New Jersey rape statute treats alike the rapist who jumps out from
the bushes with a knife or gun and threatens the victim, the rapist who uses mild
physical force to secure intercourse with an unwilling partner, and the teenage boy
who has ordinary intercourse after consensual petting, without obtaining permission
for the act.78 We can readily agree—I certainly do—that nonconsensual sexual
intercourse is wrong. But, to treat these widely disparate wrongful acts similarly is
unjust to defendants like M.T.S., invites jury nullification,79 and trivializes the
concept of forcible rape80 and the harm experienced by victims of the most violent
rapes.81
77

Although it is necessarily a matter of speculation, such legislation might have passed.
The New Jersey rape law was the product of reform efforts spurred by “a coalition of feminist
groups assisted by the National Organization of Women (NOW) National Task Force on
Rape.” M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1274. The legislature was in a rape reform mood. If my yin-yang
analysis is correct, it is unlikely there would have been a strong lobbying force to defend the
principle that the criminal law should tolerate nonconsensual sexual intercourse. Of course, if
I am wrong, and if there would have been significant public opposition to such a position, this
only buttresses the argument in the text that the state supreme court went beyond the scope of
the statute and legislative intent.
78

Compare this to WISC. STAT. ANN. § 940.225 (West 1996), which thoughtfully
distinguishes between various types of sexual assault. First degree sexual assault prohibits and
punishes aggravated forms of sexual misconduct “with another person without consent of that
person by use or threat of use of a dangerous weapon.” § 940.225(1)(b). Second degree
sexual assault also encompasses forcible rape, but here the sexual contact or intercourse is
obtained nonconsensually and forcibly, but without the use of a dangerous weapon.
§ 940.225(2)(a). Third degree sexual assault is limited to nonconsensual, nonforcible sexual
intercourse. § 940.225(3)(m). Fourth degree sexual assault, a misdemeanor, is reserved for
nonconsensual sexual contact short of intercourse. § 940.225(4).
79
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11
LAW & PHIL. 35, 58 (1992).
80
Lynne Henderson has pointed out that “[r]ape denies that you are a person, that you
exist. In contrast, lovemaking affirms your existence, and undesired sex, at least does not
completely deny your personhood.” She warns that “[t]o lose the distinction, however tenuous
and unamenable to bright line distinctions it may be, is to trivialize what rape is and what it
does to a woman.” Lynne N. Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERK. WOM. L.J.
193, 226 (1988).
81
New Jersey’s sexual assault statute does not include a martial immunity provision. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2c (West 1995). Therefore, from the perspective of the actus reus of the
offense, the post-M.T.S. law now treats the husband who turns over in bed, asks his drowsy
wife for intercourse, fails to obtain “affirmative and freely-given permission,” but proceeds
anyway, the same as it does the out-of-the-bushes knife-wielding rapist. The husband should
not have intercourse in such circumstances, of course, but his actions are not in the same
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There is more to be said about M.T.S., as it relates to the meaning of “consent.”
There are two ways one might understand this concept. First, “consent” functions to
exculpate an actor because, “if the victim concurs in mind and spirit [with the act],
[her] interests are not violated by the accused’s” acts.82 In essence, she is not a
victim at all. Alternatively, consent is a defense “if the actor knows of the consent,”
because in these circumstances “his conduct is inspired by good motives and his
action is not culpable.”83 I submit that in the context of rape, the first meaning of
“consent” applies. After all, “lack of consent” is an element of the actus reus—
indeed, the essence—of the crime of rape.84 If a female “concurs in mind and spirit”
with the act of intercourse, her interest in autonomy has not been violated.85 The
attendant social harm of rape is absent.
Why does this distinction matter? Consider a female who desperately wants to
have intercourse with a particular male, but because of a sexually conservative
upbringing cannot admit this to him. She allows the male to be intimate with her.
She concurs in mind and spirit in the act. Her (indeed, their) pleasure in the sexual
act is doubtlessly reduced because she feels too embarrassed to express her true
feelings, but she has “consented” to the intercourse. Seemingly, no rape has
occurred.
But, this same event could constitute sexual assault in New Jersey, for M.T.S.
provides that every act of sexual intercourse is forcible rape in the absence of
“affirmative and freely-given permission.” The permission does not need to be a
league with the knife-wielder. The point here is not that I believe that there is a genuine risk of
prosecution of husbands who have intercourse in the manner described in the text, for I do not
believe this. But, it is no answer to a silly rule that it is so extreme that we can trust
prosecutors to use common sense.
82
George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23
UCLA L. REV. 293, 300 (1975) (discussing the meaning of “consent” generally).
83

Id.

84

See RAINE, supra note 2, at 202 (“the difference between being a ‘sexual partner’ and a
‘victim of rape’ may be as simple as a three-letter word—fun”; even sadomasochistic sex is
not rape because “unlike rape it is consensual”); see also id. at 210 (“The difference between
sex and rape is consent.”).
85

In id. at 163, Nancy Venable Raine, the victim of a three-hour forcible rape by an
intruder into her home, eloquently and powerfully described her loss of autonomy this way:
The rapist had violated my most basic human need—my bodyright. By destroying my
ability to control my own body, he had made my body an object. I lost a sense of it as
the boundary of self, the fundamental and most sacred of all borders. A self without
boundaries is like a weak country that has been overrun by a stronger one. Once the
borders are violated and the invader is entrenched, inhabitants can do little more than
go into hiding and hope for outside aid. [Only] [t]ouch that respects bodyright is
healing; it restores the autonomy and authenticity of the self.
Ms. Raine further described the harm of her rape, id. at 206-07:
The most personal part of being raped had less to do with what happened to my body
for three hours . . . , than with what happened to my spirit. The loss of faith that there
is order and continuity in life—that life is meaningful—is the most personal of all
losses. . . . To lose faith in life was, for me, the loss of connection with the intangible
world—with soul, spirit, anima, essence, vital force, or whatever one chooses to call
it. . . .
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verbal “yes”—permission may be “inferred either from [physical] acts or
statements”86 at the time of the act—but an omission to object, that is, her failure to
indicate disapproval by resisting in some manner or simply by saying no, is not
enough to save the defendant from prosecution. And, the freely-given permission
must be “to the specific act of penetration.” Thus, in M.T.S., the teenagers
participated in consensual (and, we might assume for current purposes, permitted)
heavy petting. But, M.T.S. was guilty because he failed to obtain her permission—
or, at least lacked a reasonable belief that she granted him permission87— to move to
a higher degree of sexual intimacy. Thus, under M.T.S. and in a few other states,88
we have gone beyond the no-means-rape proposition to absence-of-yes means
forcible rape.89
86

New Jersey in re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992).

87

If M.T.S. had reasonably, although incorrectly, believed that C.G. had given him
permission to have intercourse with her, he would not have been guilty of the offense. Id. at
1278 (“The role of the factfinder is to decide . . . whether the defendant’s belief that the
alleged victim had freely given affirmative permission was reasonable.”). This is not because
the actus reus of the rape had not occurred, but rather because he lacked the mens rea required
for the offense of rape. The current focus of my textual observations, however, relate
exclusively to the actus reus component of rape—to the critical question of what conduct by a
defendant ought to be condemned as social harmful and morally wrongful. The actor’s
culpability for that harmful conduct is a separate question considered infra in Part IV.B.
88

See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(1) (1997) (prohibiting nonconsensual
intercourse), and § 3251(3) (1998) (defining “consent” as “words or actions by a person
indicating a voluntary agreement to engage in the sexual act”); WISC. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.225(4) (West. 1996) (defining consent as “words or overt actions by a person who is
competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual
intercourse or sexual contact”).
These laws are reminiscent of the 1993 version of the Sexual Offense Policy of Antioch
College relating to student behavior, which provided that “[i]f the level of sexual intimacy
increases during an interaction (i.e. if two people move from kissing while fully clothed—
which is one level—to undressing for direct physical contact, which is another level), the
people involved need to express their clear verbal consent before moving to that new level.”
David Archard, “A Nod’s As Good As a Wink”: Consent, Convention, and Reasonable Belief,
3 LEGAL THEORY 273, 288 n.23 (1997) (quoting the policy). The Antioch rules, however,
required that permission be verbal, whereas the rape laws here allow for implied permission.
89
Of course, if the female silently wanted intercourse (but failed to give permission in
some form), she is not likely to bring the matter to the attention of authorities. But, there are
some cases in which “consensual” but “unpermitted” sexual intimacy might be brought to a
prosecutor’s attention. The M.T.S. case could be just such an example, in which angry parents
may have brought the matter to the attention of the police or prosecutor. Second, if the female
does not give permission for intercourse because sexual intimacy is embarrassing to her or
because such conduct violates the values of her upbringing (as was hypothesized in the text),
the female might later feel guilty about her activities and, post hoc, object to the intimacy.
Third, a female might feel, after the fact, that the male took advantage of her in some way, and
bring charges.
The risk of prosecution in most of these cases admittedly is small. As noted in the text
supra following note 73, M.T.S. will invite embarrassing testimony likely to deter females
from reporting the offense; and such a case is ripe for jury nullification if stiff penalties are
attached. However, this only demonstrates the lack of wisdom of the rule as it relates to a
charge forcible rape, and does not strike me as a reason to retain it.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998

17

426

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:409

Let’s look at this more carefully. We need to pause to see where we are going,
because it is here that I believe matters become murky. Let’s start with the
proposition that “no means no.” This has become a mantra of the rape reform
movement, and it is an excellent one. It is a clear and proper message.90 Any person
who has sexual contact with a person who does not want it has violated the latter’s
sexual autonomy and, therefore, had wronged that individual. But, that only begins,
it does not end, the analysis.
The first issue is whether intercourse following a “no” should constitute a crime.
Not all wrongs are sufficiently egregious to justify the criminal (as distinguished
from a civil) sanction. There is no a priori method for drawing the line between
civil and criminal wrongdoing, and my purpose here is simply to suggest that we
should always be asking this question—should we criminalize?—regarding all forms
of wrongdoing, and not simply assuming that the criminal law is the only, first, or
best forum for condemning wrongful conduct. For me, however, I have no difficulty
saying—it isn’t a close issue—that a person who has nonforcible intercourse
following a “no”—however that “no” is expressed, whether in words or conduct—
has wronged that individual in a serious manner and (mens rea issues aside for now)
deserves to be treated as a criminal.91 But, that being said, his conduct should
constitute a lesser degree of rape than forcible intercourse, or even be considered a
lesser sexual offense than rape, in a thoughtful reformed system.92

90

Women, as well as men, need to learn this message. According to some studies, a
significant number of females sometimes say “no” when, in fact, they do not want the male to
desist from his efforts to obtain intercourse. E.g., Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C.
Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say No When They Mean Yes? The Prevalence and
Correlates of Token Resistance To Sex, 54 J. PERSON & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 874 (1988) (39%
of female undergraduates at Texas A&M University reported saying no to intercourse
although they “had every intention to and were willing to engage in sexual intercourse.”).
Any mixed message arising in such circumstances can lend credence to a male’s claim of
reasonable belief, which can trigger a mens rea claim on his part. See infra part IV.B.
91
Even here, however, bright lines do not work as well in determining guilt as they do in
setting cultural expectations. Schulhofer, supra note 79, at 42. After all, what does “no”
mean in romantic or sexual circumstances? The answer is fact-dependent. A “no” expressed
by a female to a male whom she barely knows is likely to have a different meaning than a
“no” from a female already in a loving and intimate relationship with the male. One “no” may
mean, “cut it out and leave me alone permanently, you jerk” whereas another one might mean,
“maybe let’s have intercourse, but not now, let’s slow down.” It would be better if the female
were to explain her “no,” but it is unrealistic to expect such precision in such circumstances.
Another issue not resolved by the no-means-no principle is what the male is supposed to
do after the “no” (other than not to proceed immediately to intercourse). May the male
continue his sexual overtures, albeit more slowly, in order to convince the female to change
her mind, or does there have to be some cooling-off period? Id. at 42-44 (discussing the
difficulties of resolving this issue).
92

Professor Stephen Schulhofer has urged that
the law of sexual abuse . . . be organized around two separate offenses, or more
precisely two distinct groups of offenses, with one or two degrees of each. “Rape”
should reach intercourse by force, in the sense of actual or threatened physical
violence. A new offense, “sexual abuse” or “sexual misconduct,” would reach
nonviolent interference with freedom of choice.
Id. at 67.
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But, M.T.S. does not say, simply, “no means no.” It says that the actus reus of
forcible rape occurs in the absence of a “yes” in words or action. This distinction
will not matter, of course, in the great majority of circumstances. Nearly always, it
may be assumed, an unwilling female will make her wishes known by resisting
verbally or physically, and a willing one will demonstrate by words and actions that
she encourages the intimacy. But, the Supreme Court of New Jersey meant to take
the law beyond the no-means-rape position, or else it would simply have held that
nonconsensual intercourse constitutes rape; it felt it constituted good public policy to
require the male to obtain affirmative permission to proceed, at the threat of a
forcible rape conviction if he does not. So, I want to consider this proposition.
It is certainly wiser for a male to obtain permission rather than to rely on a
female’s lack of objection as grounds for proceeding. We would be better off if the
culture taught boys that permission is required before having sexual contact with a
female, and if girls were taught to make their wishes known—yes or no—plainly and
truthfully to males.93 But, should we go so far as to treat the act of sexual
intercourse, performed nonforcibly with an adult female in full control of her
faculties,94 as rape for want of a “yes,” when the female could as easily have said
“no”? Again, the issue is not whether it would be better for the male to wait for a
yes—of course, it would be—but the issue is whether we should automatically
criminalize “no affirmative permission” conduct and, if we should, whether we
should treat it as a major felony.
There are practical reasons for us to rethink the leap from no-means-no to
absence-of-yes-means-no rape. First, as M.T.S. itself demonstrates, this rule hardly
makes life easier for the complainant at the criminal trial. In the absence of a
straightforward “yes” or “no,” the parties will have to explicitly describe the sexual
events of the evening, right down to every minute and embarrassing detail. The
issue will not be whether the male threatened to hurt the female, punched her, or
threw her down on the ground, nor will the evidence focus on her screams, cries for
help, or her efforts to push him off of her, all of which demonstrate lack of consent.
Such testimony is traumatic to a crime victim—it is traumatic for any victim of any
crime to be required to replay the events in the non-therapeutic atmosphere of a
criminal trial—but testimony by the woman about how she resisted the male is far
less embarrassing than the type of testimony we can expect to see in the new M.T.S.
world, where the male will testify to every nuance in the female’s behavior, all for
the purpose of showing that the complainant gave permission, if not in words then in
action. In a world in which no-means-no, the affirmative rejection by the female
ends the analysis, at least in so far as proof of the actus reus is concerned.95
Therefore, I am not sure M.T.S. is a step forward for female witnesses in rape law.

The Model Penal Code, as well, has reorganized the sex offenses by including a lesser
crime than rape, which it terms “gross sexual imposition.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)
(1985).
93

This does not always occur. See supra note 90.

94

Thus, of course, I am putting aside here the rape of an adult female who is asleep or
otherwise unconscious, mentally disordered, or severely intoxicated.
95

See RAINE, supra note 2, at 214 (defining “forced sexual contact” as “a woman saying no
and a man not taking her at her word”).
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But, there is more. When a female says “no,” she is an active and equal
participant in the story. She has made her wishes known. If the male proceeds
against her expressed wishes, his actions justify condemnation. But, in the case of a
female who says nothing—perhaps, as in M.T.S., the parties are involved in heavy
petting or some romantic interlude and the male nonforcibly, but unilaterally,
proceeds to a greater degree of sexual intimacy—is not the female also responsible
for what occurs? This is not to hearken back to a physical resistance requirement;
this is simply to say that verbal resistance is resistance.96 As Vivian Berger has
written “overprotection risks enfeebling instead of empowering women.”97 Men
should be taught in our culture to seek permission; but women should also be taught
in our culture to express their wishes, whether it is to invite or reject sexual contact.
Reformers sometimes suggest that a woman should not be required to say “no” in
order for the sexual act to constitute a crime, just as a theft victim is not required by
the law to resist or otherwise object to the taking of her property in order for the
latter to constitute a crime. Many feminists reason that to require a “no” in the rape
context, but not in the theft case, is to place property rights on a higher plane than
sexual autonomy.98
This is a fair observation, but we should not oversimplify the problem. Consider
the case of a person who leaves his car unlocked and keys in the ignition in a highcrime area where, inevitably and foreseeably, it is stolen. It is theft, of course, even
without a “no” from the owner. Consider now a member of a college fraternity who
has sexual relations with a co-ed who is asleep or, perhaps, too intoxicated to know
what is going on. The law, quite properly, treats the male’s actions as rape, in the
absence of a “no” and very likely even if there is a heavily intoxicated “yes.”99 The
male is properly punished for taking advantage of the female’s vulnerability—her
lack of opportunity to meaningfully object—even if the victim was responsible for
her own vulnerability in the intoxication scenario.
But, what if a car owner stands by as another person walks up to the car, looks at
the owner, smiles, and slowly gets into the unlocked car and turns the key sitting in
the ignition, and drives away. Theft? Yes, if the car owner did not want the vehicle
taken. The absence of a “no” does not, in itself, constitute consent. But, if the
person who takes the vehicle is a close friend or relative of the owner, a jury might
(although, it need not) infer from the owner’s absence of resistance or verbal
objection that the taking was not against her will, although the taker cannot point to
any affirmative act that demonstrates permission.100 Under such circumstances, the
taking should not constitute theft.

96

Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 624, 634 (1979) (Wilner, J., dissenting).

97

Vivian Berger, Not So Simple Rape, 7 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS (Winter/Spring 1988), at 69,

76.
98

Not all feminists agree with the rape-theft analogy. Some say that it “wildly
misdescribes the experience of rape,” which is more analogous to murder than to a property
crime. West, supra note 14, at 1448.
99

E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 261(a)(3)-(4) (West Supp. 1999).

100

Alternatively, the taker might reasonably believe he has consent in such circumstances,
which would raise a mens rea claim.
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Shift now to a “sexual taking.” There are two important differences between a
property taking and sexual one. First, sexual autonomy is a more valuable and
important right than the right to retain one’s automobile. This suggests two
conflicting points: a culpable violation of another’s sexual autonomy deserves far
greater punishment than a property taking; but, society may have a right to expect
people to take greater care to protect what is more valuable, namely, their autonomy.
Therefore, it does not seem unfair as a matter of social policy to expect a simple “no”
in words or conduct, when another person, in unthreatening circumstances, indicates
a desire to be sexually intimate.
The second difference is that, unlike a car taking or, say, a bone breaking, which
mentally healthy people rarely want to occur, sexual contact ordinarily is a
pleasurable event that humans generally seek rather than avoid. Therefore, it is not
grossly unreasonable to expect the parties to make their wishes evident in sexual
affairs. When the woman, in nonforcible nonthreatening circumstances—as in
M.T.S. where the parties were already participating in mutually desired heavy
petting—does not object in any manner to the other person’s overtures for
intercourse, it strikes me that we should be hesitant to treat the male’s actions as a
major felony.
Again, let me emphasize what I am saying, and what I am not saying, because the
lines are very thin here. With forcible rape, the law should focus on the male’s
conduct—on the force or threats of physical harm. As long as the concept of force is
a realistic one, nothing more should be necessary to prove the actus reus of the
offense. Physical resistance should not be required.
When we shift to nonforcible cases (that is, to cases in which the only force is the
inherent touching that sexual intercourse itself involves), the issue, quite simply,
should be whether the intercourse was consensual or nonconsensual. Nonconsensual
intercourse should be an offense, although a lesser one than intercourse obtained
forcibly. In determining whether the female consented to the sexual intimacy, the
bright-line rule that “no (in words or actions) means no” is a good one.101 The more
difficult question is how to deal with the situation in which a mentally alert adult
female fails to object in any manner, when she has the opportunity to do so. The
bottom line ultimately is the same: did the female want the intimacy to occur at this
time or not? The law should be prepared to answer this question in the negative,
even in the absence of a “no,” if the objective circumstances suggest beyond a
reasonable doubt that she did not desire sexual intimacy, notwithstanding her silence.
For example, there may be evidence that the woman froze up in fright, although the
man did not threaten her in any manner. But, proof of affirmative permission should
not be required in order for the male to avoid conviction. The burden should be on
the Government to prove her lack of consent despite her silence, rather than to
require the defendant, as a practical matter, to prove that she gave permission. The
message, “no means no” is an excellent reform measure; “absence of no means no”
is not.
This leaves us with one other issue that I only wish to note briefly here. If we are
going to punish nonconsensual sexual contact, even when there is no physical force
or threatened force intimated, then we must look with more care than in the past at
what constitutes “voluntary” consent or, in M.T.S., “freely given” permission. It is

101

But see supra note 91.
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easy to determine that permission or consent is coerced if the man has a knife, uses
his fists, or threatens physical injury, but what now? We necessarily return to the
question of the female’s role in the situation.
The hypotheticals are endless. If an employer offers a job to an applicant in
exchange for sex, is this “lack of freely given permission”? Does it matter whether
the applicant could easily have found another job of equal value? Or, suppose that a
female with few employment skills and a couple of children from a previous
marriage lives with a male in his home. Suppose that after some months, he
threatens to end the relationship—effectively kick her and the children out on the
street—unless she has sexual relations more often than in the past, or unless she
agrees to specific forms of sexual contact that she finds distasteful. If she consents
rather than being evicted, is this coerced or freely-given?102
These are no easy answers to what constitutes duress. Although courts
sometimes suggest otherwise,103 the law does not really treat coercion as an
empirical matter: we do not really seek to determine what is undeterminable,
namely, whether a particular person’s “free will” (whatever that is) was overborne.
The real issue is normative: What degree of fortitude do we have a right to expect
from ordinary human beings when they are confronted—as we all are in our daily
lives—by hard decisions, by great temptations, and by lawful and unlawful
pressures?104
The best approach, I submit here, is to apply the Model Penal Code concept of
“gross sexual imposition,” that is, a person is guilty of an offense if the other party
submits to the sexual act by “any threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of
ordinary resolution.”105 Only threats, and not temptations, should constitute a
potential criminal offense.
But, this offense (a lesser crime than rape)
encompasses—as it should—non-physical threats, such as threats of economic harm.
If such a non-physical threat is made, the woman is—and should be—required to
resist the male (although the “resistance” should only require a simple “no”) unless
the threat is one that would cause a woman of ordinary fortitude to accede without
resistance.106 Ultimately, the matter should be left to the good sense of a jury.
B. Mens Rea
It is a fundamental principle of the criminal law—“no provincial or transient
notion”107—that we do not send people to prison and stigmatize them as serious
wrongdoers in the absence of culpability for their actions. No matter how serious the
harm caused, the general rule is that a person is not guilty of a criminal offense in the
102

This hypothetical is inspired by Schulhofer, supra note 79, at 84-88.

103

E.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959) (in police interrogation context,
concluding that “petitioner’s will was overborne” by the police tactics).
104

Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching
For Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1365-66 (1989).
105

MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(a) (1985).

106

Approximately 20 jurisdictions now prohibit non-physical forms of coercion used to
secure sexual relations. Patricia J. Falk, Rape By Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L.
REV. 1, 119 (1998).
107

Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
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absence of mens rea.108 Imagine for a moment that you are driving safely on the
highway, under an overpass, when a piece of the bridge crumbles, strikes your
windshield, and causes you to lose control of your car. As a consequence, your car
strikes and kills another. You are likely to feel awful about what happened, and in
criminal law terms, you have committed the actus reus of criminal homicide. That
is, you have caused precisely the type of harm that the criminal law wishes to
prevent, the death of another human being. But, of course, you are guilty of no
crime. You did not kill the pedestrian intentionally, or even recklessly or
negligently.
Increasingly, we are forgetting—or, at least, at risk of forgetting—this basic
culpability principle in the context of rape. In one sense, this is understandable. The
female who is the victim of undesired sexual contact is initially apt to feel just as
violated, whether the male knew he was acting against her will or, at the other
extreme, was understandably clueless.109 The harm to her, after all, is the same.110
But, of course, the harm to the dead person on the highway in the imagined overpass
accident is the same whether you killed him purposely or innocently—nonetheless,
the law will exculpate you for the death assuming non-culpability in causing the
harm. Unfortunately, as obvious as this seems, some people find the notion of a
mens rea requirement in the rape context silly. The principle that a male should not
be convicted of rape if he reasonably (but incorrectly) believed that the female
consented has been trivialized (or distorted) to mean that “a woman [was] raped but
not by a rapist”?111
Before rape law reform, the issue of mens rea rarely arose in rape trials. As a
practical matter, the actus reus proved the mens rea. If a male used or threatened
force to obtain intercourse, then it was evident that he purposely or knowingly had
108

See DRESSLER, supra note 23, at § 10.01.

109

I have added the word “initially.” According to Holmes, “[e]ven a dog distinguishes
between being stumbled over and being kicked.” OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3
(1881). One may question the accuracy of Holmes’s observation of dogs. With humans,
however, it is a fairly common experience that we do draw a distinction between being
harmed and being wronged, by which I mean here that if I am harmed in some way, I am
likely to feel more victimized if I learn that the party causing the harm wanted me to be hurt—
he chose to violate my rights—than if the injury occurred unintentionally. And, I will not feel
wronged (only harmed) if the injury occurred in an entirely nonculpable manner.
Nonetheless, the initial reaction of most humans to a human-caused injury is anger—to
assume that the harmdoer acted intentionally. Our feelings are only assuaged when we learn
that the victimizer acted innocently. In this sense, Holmes’s canine observation may be
accurate. A dog, too, may snarl at the moment of the stumble/kick, but, at least my dog
instantly “forgives” me if the “kick” is followed by a demonstration on my part of my warm
feelings and love for him. This is the dog equivalent, perhaps, to the defendant’s statement, “I
didn’t mean to do it.”
110

But not the wrongdoing. See id.

111

MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 654. This is like saying that the victim in the highway
accident “was murdered, but not by a murderer.” Of course, this is wrong from the law’s
perspective. The word “murder” is a legal conclusion. The correct statement is that the
person “was killed [or was the victim of a homicide] but not by a murderer.” Similarly, the
woman in the rape case is the victim of unwanted intercourse, but not necessarily by a rapist.
She is a victim of harm, but the harmdoer is not necessarily a criminal.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998

23

432

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:409

nonconsensual sexual relations. If his conduct was not forcible, the female had to
resist, and this gave the male reasonable warning of her lack of consent: if he
proceeded against her resistance, a jury could reasonably assume that he knew she
did not want sexual relations. At a minimum, the resistance meant that the male
acted recklessly or negligently in regard to her wishes. Thus, there was always some
form of culpability proven.
With the abandonment or softening of the resistance requirement and the
increased willingness of lawmakers to permit prosecutions for nonforcible forms of
nonconsensual intercourse—an appropriate change, as I have suggested—the risk of
conviction in the absence of mens rea is enhanced. A person who sincerely believes
that his partner has consented to sexual intimacy should not be convicted of rape if
his belief was one that a reasonable person in the same circumstances might hold.
And, indeed, this has been the traditional rule for “general intent” offenses, such as
rape.112
It is too early to know where rape law is going in regard to mens rea, but there
are some distressing signs. One concern I have is that courts may abandon altogether
the requirement of mens rea in the rape context. Recently, the Supreme Judicial
Council of Massachusetts, an historically liberal court, and thus one that might be
expected to honor the requirement of culpability, held that even a reasonable (but
incorrect) belief as to a female's consent, is not a defense in a rape prosecution.113
Thus, even if a reasonable person in the actor’s situation would have believed that
the female was consenting, the male is guilty of rape, although the victim did not
physically or verbally resist his overtures, and although he did not use or threaten to
use any force. It would be as if you were convicted as a murderer for killing
accidentally when the bridgework crumbled.
An appellate court in Massachusetts explained that the no-defense rule was “in
harmony with the analogous rule that a defendant in a statutory rape case is not
entitled to an instruction that a reasonable mistake as to the victim’s age is a
defense.”114 But, it is only in harmony if one ignores the basic point that statutory
rape is a grave exception to the general rule that mens rea matters. Wisely or not,
most (although not all115) jurisdictions treat statutory rape as an exceptional strict
liability offense, in order to protect young females from the effects of their own
decisions.
Ordinary rape, however, has not been viewed as strict liability in
character.116 There is simply no more principled basis for dispensing with the mens
rea requirement in rape cases than there is in regard to any other serious crime.
112

DRESSLER, supra note 23, at 138.

113

Commonwealth v. Ascolillo, 541 N.E.2d 570, 575 (Mass. 1989).

114

Commonwealth v. Simcock, 575 N.E.2d 1137, 1142 (Mass. 1991).

115

E.g., State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978) (a reasonable mistake of fact as to the
female’s age is a defense to statutory rape); People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964)
(same); MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 (1) (1985) (permitting a defense of mistake of age,
except where the child is under 10 years of age).
116

Indeed, a few courts, e.g., Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan, [1976] App.Cas.
182, and the Model Penal Code treat rape as if it were what the common law characterizes as a
“specific intent crime.” Thus, under Code § 213.1(1), a person is not guilty of rape unless he
purposely, knowingly, or recklessly compelled the female to have intercourse. And, under
§ 2.04(1), a person is not guilty of an offense if his mistake of fact (here, the female’s lack of
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Massachusetts, of course, is just one state. I do not mean to cry wolf here, but
certain other judicial decisions suggest that courts might be prepared to erode, if not
abolish, the mens rea requirement. Even if a person is entitled to be acquitted on the
ground of a reasonable mistake of fact, courts might impose special rules regarding
mistake claims in rape prosecutions that would effectively strip the defendant of the
claim. For example, consider Justice Frederick Brown’s remarks in Commonwealth
v. Lefkowitz:117
The essence of the offense of rape is lack of consent on the part of the
victim. I am prepared to say that when a woman says "no" to someone
any implication other than a manifestation of non-consent that might arise
in that person's psyche is legally irrelevant, and thus no defense. Any
further action is unwarranted and the person proceeds at his peril. In
effect, he assumes the risk. In 1985, I find no social utility in establishing
a rule defining non-consensual intercourse on the basis of the subjective
(and quite likely wishful) view of the more aggressive player in the sexual
encounter.118
In short, if a female says no (I assume he means in words or actions) to intercourse,
not only does this prove the actus reus of the offense, but it automatically proves the
mens rea. If the defendant asserts a mistake claim, Justice Brown would consider
the mistake unreasonable as a matter of law. Thus, the issue would not go to the
jury.
“No means no” is an excellent rule to teach men (and women) in our culture.
And, it is an excellent starting point—initial premise—in rape trials. But, bright-line
rules such as this can only result, at best, in the correct outcome most of the time.
Such rules do not assure justice to the individual whose case might not fit the brightline assumptions. As troubling as it is to acknowledge, no does not always—in one
hundred percent of the cases—mean no in sexual relations, even today.119 If no does
not always mean no, there can surely be cases in which a reasonable person could
believe that no does not mean no in the specific incident, even when it does. Such
cases will be relatively few in number, but it is improper to convict a person on the
basis of the law of averages. It is wrong to use the bludgeon of the criminal law to
impose rules intended to change cultural attitudes when this means punishing an
individual for rape who made a mistake that the community, represented by the
jurors, would characterize as reasonable.
If the mistake was, indeed,

consent) negatives the element of purpose, knowledge, or recklessness. Thus, under some
circumstances, even an unreasonable mistake of fact is a defense in a Code jurisdiction, since
such a mistake might only prove that the male was negligent, and not reckless, in his belief.
The Code, however, was adopted in 1962, well before commencement of the trends I am
discussing here.
117

481 N.E.2d 227, 232 (Mass. 1985) (Brown, J., concurring).

118

In R v. Esau, 148 D.L.R.4th 662 (1997), one Justice on the Supreme Court of Canada
took an even more hardened position by stating that “[a]n accused who infers consent from
passivity without more makes a dishonest, irresponsible inference.” Id. at 686 (McLachlin, J.,
dissenting).
119

See supra note 90.
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unreasonable120—or if the jurors don’t believe the defendant’s claim that he was
mistaken—they can convict on the facts. The jury should not be deprived of the
issue of mens rea through bright-line rules. Each case should be considered on its
own merits.
The last sentence brings us to another way courts may improperly take the mens
rea issue away from the jury. Various courts, led by the California Supreme Court,
now provide that a “reasonable belief as to consent” jury instruction should not be
given unless there is “substantial evidence of equivocal conduct” on the part of the
female “that would have led a defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe
consent existed where it did not.”121 On its face, this rule makes sense; on closer
inspection, the equivocality rule is illogical and potentially unfair.122
Let us start with People v. Mayberry,123 the case in which the California Supreme
Court first held that a defendant’s reasonable belief regarding consent was a
“defense”124 in rape prosecutions. In order to see how far rape law has changed—
how the California Supreme Court has virtually shut the door on mistake claims in
forcible rape prosecutions125—it is necessary to look at the facts of that case with
some specificity.
In Mayberry, the complainant testified that the defendant, a stranger, grabbed her
by the arm on the street. According to her, she dug her fingernails into him, after
which he angrily kicked her, struck her with a bottle, and yelled obscenities at her.
She went into a nearby store but the defendant followed her in. She found nobody to
help her. Out of fear and confusion, she accompanied the defendant outside the
store, where they remained for about 20 minutes. She testified that he threateningly
demanded sex, struck her with his fist when she refused to go with him, and warned
her he would “knock every tooth out of [her] mouth,” if she did not cooperate.126 In
order “to buy time” she asked permission to go to another store and buy cigarettes;
120
For example, in Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, (Pa. 1992), aff’d, 641
A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994), the complainant testified that she said “no” in a scolding manner when
the defendant made sexual advances, whereas the defendant claimed that her “no’s” were
“moaned passionately.” Id. at 1341. It is possible, of course, that the defendant knew full well
that she was not consenting. It is also possible that the defendant heard what he wanted to
hear. The jury should make that determination.
121
People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961 (Cal. 1992); see also Regina v. Park, [1995] 2 S.C.R.
836, 838 (a jury instruction on mistake will not be given unless the claim of mistake has an
“air of reality”).
122

By far the most thorough critique of the equivocality doctrine is found in Rosanna
Cavallaro, A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of Mistake of Fact About Consent in Rape, 86
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 815 (1996).
123

542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975).
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The word “defense” is in quotations, because the ultimate issue really is whether the
defendant possessed the requisite mens rea to be convicted of rape. See infra the text
accompanying notes 148-53.
125
Williams, 841 P.2d at 973 (Kennard, J., concurring) (stating that under the new rule
announced in the instant case, it will “indeed [be] a rare case” in which the evidence would
support a jury finding of “reasonable mistake” in a rape prosecution).
126

542 P.2d at 1340.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss3/3

26

1998]

RAPE LAW REFORM

435

he agreed, but when she entered with him she felt “completely beaten” and did not
seek help from the clerk. Outside she said she “put on an act” and tried “to fool” the
defendant by engaging in conversation while sitting on a curb.127 But he seized her
elbow, took her to his apartment, barricaded the door, and after 15 minutes of
conversation, engaged in intercourse with her, at times striking her. In stark contrast
to this testimony, Mayberry testified that he and complainant met and engaged in
conversation, that he went with her to purchase cigarettes, and then the two went
without protest or force to his apartment where nonviolent intercourse occurred.128
Thus, there was an “evidentiary chasm”129: her description of the facts suggested
forcible, nonconsensual rape; the defendant claimed “mutuality and consent.”130
Based on the conflicting testimony, the Mayberry court held that the defendant was
entitled to an instruction on reasonable mistake-of-fact. That is, the jury could
believe his story of consent, and acquit on that ground. But it could also believe her
claims of force and, thus, lack of consent, and yet the defendant was still entitled to
an instruction that he should be acquitted if the jury believed that he genuinely
thought that she consented and that this belief was reasonable.
Now, of course, based on the appellate court’s summary of the facts, it is hard to
believe that a jury would buy the defendant’s claim of reasonable mistake. It is
indeed unlikely that it would find that the defendant even subjectively believed she
consented. But, that is a matter ordinarily left to the jury to decide. The issue here is
much narrower: Is the defendant entitled to an instruction that will permit the jury to
consider his lack-of-mens rea claim. He was entitled, according to Mayberry.131
But, seventeen years later, the California Supreme Court reversed directions in
People v. Williams.132 As in Mayberry, Williams involved sharply conflicting
testimony. The complainant lived in a homeless shelter. The defendant, a volunteer
and resident of the shelter, befriended the complainant and, after spending the
morning walking with her and engaging in conversation, offered to take her
elsewhere to watch television. She agreed, because she “thought they were going to
‘his friends or something.’”133 She went with him to a building where he rang a
buzzer and was admitted. Inside, she observed the defendant rent a room and ask a
clerk for a sheet. At this point, according to the complainant’s testimony, she
realized they were in a hotel. They went into the room he rented. She observed no
television. He sat on the bed and asked her to join him. She refused and suggested
that he get his money back and leave. She went to the door to let herself out, but he
stopped her. He hollered at her that he “didn’t spend $20.00 for nothing.”134 She
testified that he then punched her in the left eye, ordered her onto the bed, and when
she refused, pushed her down on it, got on top of her, and engaged in intercourse.
127

Id. at 1341.

128

Id.

129

Cavallaro, supra note 122, at 824.
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The defendant’s testimony was similar up to the point they entered the hotel
room. He said that he did not want or expect to have sex with her, but that inside the
room she kissed and hugged him and removed her clothing. He testified that he
suffered from diabetes and, as a result, was nearly impotent. Therefore, he testified,
she rubbed his penis for 15 minutes and then assisted him in inserting his penis
inside her. After the intercourse, he said, she demanded money, and when he
refused, she threatened to “fix” him.135
The prosecutor and defense both requested a Mayberry reasonable belief
instruction, but the trial judge refused. The California Supreme Court agreed with
the trial court. It held that a Mayberry defense has two components, the first of
which is the defendant’s subjective but mistaken belief that the victim consented.
The court stated that the defendant’s burden in this regard could only be satisfied by
evidence “of the victim’s equivocal conduct on the basis of which [the defendant]
erroneously believed there was consent.”136 Second,
the defendant must satisfy the objective component, which asks whether
the defendant’s mistake regarding consent was reasonable under the
circumstances. Thus, regardless of how strongly a defendant may
subjectively believe a person has consented to sexual intercourse, that
belief must be formed under circumstances society will tolerate as
reasonable in order . . . [to] give rise to a Mayberry instruction.137
The California Supreme Court stated that the evidence here involved “wholly
divergent accounts” of what occurred—a fully consensual act versus one of force—
and there was “no middle ground from which Williams could argue he reasonably
misinterpreted” the complainant’s conduct.138
If there was no equivocal conduct in Williams, where was it in Mayberry? One
can read Mayberry for the proposition that no equivocal conduct is necessary to raise
a mens rea claim. That is, a jury is not required to accept in whole either the
defendant’s or the complainant’s testimony; it may choose to patch together aspects
of both versions of the events in a way that makes it possible for it to find that the
defendant believed, although incorrectly, that the victim consented. And, it is for the
jury to decide whether this belief was reasonable.
But, there is language in Mayberry that might explain and distinguish Williams.
In Mayberry, after the court ruled that a jury instruction was necessary in the case, it
stated that “[i]n addition, part of [the complainant’s] testimony furnishes support for
the requested instructions. It appears from her testimony that her behavior was
equivocal.”139 The equivocal conduct, according to the court, was her conversation
on the curb when she put “on her act,” and her “admitted failure physically to resist
him” at various stages in the process. Such behavior, the court suggested, “might
have misled [the defendant] as to whether she was consenting.”140
135
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But, surely, this is not equivocal conduct. Some of the asserted “conduct”
consists of omissions—failure to resist. And, more importantly, how could a
defendant interpret the victim’s conversation with him as implying her consent, in
light of the force he used before and after? If this does represent equivocal conduct,
then surely it existed in Williams, given the victim’s conceded willingness to go with
him to the hotel room. Williams’s jury perhaps would have agreed with Ann
Landers’s comment that “the woman who ‘repairs to some private place for a few
drinks and a little shared affection’ has, by her acceptance of such a cozy invitation,
given the man reason to believe she is a candidate for whatever he might have in
mind?”141 The fact that I and many others consider this an outrageous comment is
largely beside the point: the issue is not what outcome a reasonable jury should
reach on the facts, but what outcome it could reach. If the Mayberry jury was
entitled to an instruction, surely so was the jury in Williams.142
In this regard, consider also the events leading up to boxer Michael Tyson’s rape
conviction.143 The complainant admitted that she went willingly with him to his
hotel room. From there the facts diverge. She said she went to the bathroom and
when she came out he was in his underwear and that he forcibly had intercourse with
her. He testified that they kissed and touched in the limousine on the way to the
hotel, and that upstairs they had entirely consensual intercourse. As in Williams, the
appellate court justified the trial judge’s refusal to give a “mistake” instruction
because there was no middle ground in this testimony.144 The court did not permit
the defendant to argue to the jury that it might choose to believe the complainant’s
testimony that she did not consent to intercourse (the actus reus of the offense was
committed), but that Tyson could have believed Ann Landers’s spin on such
conduct.
Of course, the answer to all of this may be that cases such as Mayberry, on the
one hand, and Tyson and Williams, on the other hand, are indistinguishable, and that
the latter decisions are rightly decided. This is a plausible response, and even one to
which I am sympathetic. But, let me suggest some reasons why we should not be
overly quick to accept Williams. First, Williams puts the defendant in the strange
position that the stronger the case of consent, the less likely the defendant is entitled
to a Mayberry instruction. According to Justice Mosk, who concurred in Williams,
the rule of that case
lead[s] to untenable results. It would effectively prohibit the defendant to
attempt to raise a reasonable doubt about the intent element of rape unless
he concedes the no-consent element. In other words, to offer the defense
he would have to take the position that he was mistaken about the
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Ann Landers, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 1985, at 9 (quoted in SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL
RAPE 100 (1987)).
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Even the prosecutor in Williams requested a jury instruction on mistake, which is some
indication that the State believed that Mayberry applied.
143
Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 626
N.E.2d 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), habeas corpus denied, Tyson v. Trigg, 883 F.Supp. 1213
(S.D. Ind. 1994), aff’d, 50 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 1995).
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Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d at 448; see also Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d at 295.
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complainant’s consent—and thereby admit, at least by implication, that
the complainant did not in fact consent. That is illogical. . . .
But, . . . “consent” and “mistaken belief in consent” are simply not at
issue. “Consent” and “reasonable and honest belief in consent” are. And
they are compatible.145
Mosk’s point is that what we commonly call a “mistake” instruction is really a
“reasonable belief” instruction. That is, if the defendant reasonably believes the
female consented, he is not guilty of the offense, whether or not that belief is
accurate.
The Williams rule, “virtually bar[s] the jury from entertaining a
reasonable doubt about the intent element until it resolves the no-consent element in
the People’s favor.”146 There is no reason why a jury should not be permitted to rule
for the defendant on the basis of lack-of-mens rea, without first deciding whether the
actus reus was committed. Yet, Williams precludes this, by characterizing the mens
rea issue as a “mistake about consent” claim, rather than a “belief about consent”
claim.
Williams is also wrong in treating the “substantial equivocal conduct”
requirement as determinative of the subjective prong of the “reasonable belief”
requirement. There is no reason why a judge (in determining whether a Mayberry
instruction to the jury should be given) should look exclusively at the female’s
conduct to determine if it is sufficiently equivocal to justify a defendant’s assertion
that he believed that she consented. The male’s belief that the female has consented
to intercourse may be a correct belief (in which case the actus reus of the offense, as
well, did not occur) or an incorrect one (the actus reus did occur). An incorrect
belief may be reasonable—one that an ordinary and reasonable person might
possess—or the belief may be irrational, unreasonable, stupid, or down right bizarre.
But, a belief is a belief. If the defendant claims that he believed that the woman
consented, it is up to the jury to decide whether, in fact, the defendant possessed that
belief or instead is committing perjury.
The real issue should be whether the defendant’s belief is reasonable. That is, if
Williams is rightly decided, it is because we believe that there is no way a reasonable
jury could find that Williams’s subjective belief was objectively reasonable. But,
this point needs to be placed in perspective. A defendant has a constitutional right to
trial by jury; when a judge decides that there is no way that a jury could find a
particular fact to exist based on the evidence introduced and, therefore, refuses to
instruct the jury on that issue, the judge substitutes herself for the jury as factfinder.
In order to avoid a constitutional violation, courts have set a very low evidentiary
standard in regard to criminal law defenses. For example, when a self-defense
theory is raised, even minimally, by the evidence, a defendant is entitled to have the
jury instructed on that theory “regardless of whether such evidence is strong or weak,
unimpeached or contradicted.”147 Williams seems in conflict with this principle.
But, the problem with Williams is more serious than the prior example suggests.
Self-defense—my example above—is an affirmative defense. That is, a defendant
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who seeks to prove self-defense does not, by making such a claim, deny the fact that
he possessed the mens rea of the offense, e.g., the intent to kill or cause bodily
injury. He seeks to justify that intent on self-protection grounds. In contrast, a rape
defendant who claims that he believed that the victim consented to intercourse is
arguing that he lacks the mens rea of the offense. That is, a mistake-of-fact claim in
a rape prosecution constitutes a failure-of-proof claim148—a claim that the
prosecution has not, in fact, proven beyond a reasonable doubt one of the essential
elements of the offense, the defendant’s culpability.
Why should this distinction matter? The reason is that the Constitution requires
the prosecutor to prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt,149
but the Constitution does not compel the State to carry the burden of persuasion
regarding defenses to crimes.150 As a result of this distinction, a trial judge does not
need to instruct the jury on a defense unless the defendant produces "more than a
scintilla” of evidence, “slight evidence,” “some credible evidence” or “evidence
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt” in regard to the defense.151
But, no matter how compelling and even uncontradicted the prosecutor’s case is
in regard to the elements of the crime, a trial judge may not direct a verdict for
conviction,152 but must let the jury determine for itself whether the prosecution has
satisfied its constitutional burden of proof. I would argue from this that, as a matter
of fair play, although apparently not constitutional edict,153 courts should hesitate
long and hard before they ease the Government’s constitutional burden of proof
regarding the element of mens rea by refusing to instruct the jury in regard to a
defendant’s “reasonable belief” claim. Let juries convict men who claim mistake in
implausible cases; but be very, very slow to deny defendants the opportunity to have
their theory of the case heard by juries. And, surely, the standard for determining
when a “reasonable belief” (or “mistake”) instruction is required should be no
harsher in rape cases than in other criminal prosecutions.
V. RAPE BY FRAUD
I have stated that intercourse obtained by nonphysical threat should be an
offense, although a lesser one than the forcible variety.154 But, how should the law
deal with consent obtained by fraud? The traditional rule is that consent obtained by
fraud-in-the-factum—when the defrauded party does not know that she has
consented to intercourse—is a nullity, whereas fraud-in-the-inducement—when the
defrauded party knows that she has consented to intercourse, but was induced to do
148

1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 22 (1984).

149

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1977).
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ROBINSON, supra note 148, at 35-36. Put differently, the defendant has the burden of
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153
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See supra text accompanying notes 105-06.
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so by deceit—does not vitiate the consent.155 Thus, a female who agrees to insertion
of a surgical instrument in her vagina by her male doctor, is the victim of rape if the
doctor has intercourse with her instead,156 but a female who agrees to intercourse on
the fraudulently induced belief that it will cure her of a disease has not been raped.157
I have purposely juxtaposed the medical examples to show how odd the
traditional rule seems to be. Why should one form of fraud negate consent, but not
the other? The rule seems even more objectionable when one realizes that in the
case of common law larceny, either form of fraud used to obtained possession of
another’s property ordinarily constitutes a “trespassory taking;”158 whether the
offense is characterized as larceny or larceny by trick, the fraud is criminal. So why
not with rape?159
Generally speaking, but only generally speaking, the law of rape should not differ
from larceny law in regard to fraud. A person’s right to sexual autonomy is surely
violated when consent is granted as the result of material misrepresentations, and the
harm in such cases may even smack of misappropriation, as in theft.160 But, we
should not move too quickly to the rule that all forms of fraud are equal, because
they are not.
Securing sexual relations by fraud in the factum is a serious wrong. The victim’s
body is used by the perpetrator for sexual gratification without giving the victim the
opportunity to consent to intercourse. There is no qualitative difference between this
and sexual intercourse with an unconscious female, which is often prohibited by
statute.161 And, the defendant’s culpability is great, since he purposely manipulated
the victim. He can make no serious claim of reasonable, or even unreasonable,
mistake of fact.
In contrast, the woman who is fraudulently induced to have intercourse has not
been wronged as seriously as the fraud-in-the-factum victim, because she has made a
choice, albeit a misinformed one. A male who fraudulently induces a female to have
intercourse has committed a moral wrong. But, as always, the question that must be
asked is: Is his conduct serious enough to justify the criminal sanction? And, if it is,
does it justify the level of punishment accorded to forcible rape or, for that matter,
fraud-in-the-factum rape?
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DRESSLER, supra note 23, at § 33.04[C].

156

PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 37, at 215 (and cases cited therein).
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Although there is no self-evident answer, I would assert that a male who exploits
a female’s naivete in order to secure sexual relations is acting in a manner wrongful
enough to justify the community’s sanction.162 But, once one agrees that fraud-inthe-inducement vitiates consent in rape cases, we are left with a line-drawing issue.
If all cases of such fraud vitiate consent, then rape occurs in such disparate cases as
the doctor who falsely convinces his patient that she has a disease that is best treated
by intercourse with him,163 to the male who falsely claims to be a Hollywood
producer and promises to get Actress an audition for a major role in a movie if she
sleeps with him, to the male who falsely claims to Greedy Monica, the object of his
sexual desires, that he is a millionaire, and thereby induces her to believe that her
sexual compliance will result in marriage and a wealthy future.
In each of these examples, the male has acted wrongly. He has exploited the
victim for his own sexual purposes. But, the wrongdoing here is not as serious as
forcible rape, in which bodily integrity is also at stake, or of fraud-in-the-factum
rape, in which the victim has made no decision to have intercourse. Indeed, we
would be guilty of seriously trivializing the harm suffered in those other rape cases if
we were to characterize Actress and Greedy Monica as “rape” victims.
Depending on the facts, Actress and Greedy Monica may justly be held partially
responsible for their own plight. They evinced false interest in the men in order to
further their own interests. Each party was manipulating the other. What do we do,
for example, if Actress, through no fault of the male, believed the man was a
producer, feigned sexual interest in him, only after which the man took the
opportunity to play Producer to the hilt? The cases of Actress and Greedy Monica
strike me as petty criminal conduct, at most. They do not deserve to be equated to
forcible intercourse, intercourse coerced by serious economic threats, fraud-in-thefactum rape, or intercourse induced by a promise to cure a serious disease. In short,
not only does fraud-in-the-inducement justify less punishment than the other forms
of sexual misconduct, but fraudulently induced intercourse varies in seriousness on a
case-by-case basis.
I am tentatively persuaded that the fraud-in-the-inducement cases ought to
constitute a crime. If a person is guilty of a theft crime when he “purposely obtain[s]
property of another by deception,”164 I am persuaded that sex by deception justifies
162

Some judges have treated the plight of female victims of fraud with derision. E.g.,
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the criminal sanction, although lawmakers should treat it as a significantly less
serious offense than other forms of sexual misconduct.165 And, truth be told, I would
hope that prosecutors would use their substantial discretion to pick and choose only
the worst cases of deception for prosecution. If prosecutors become too aggressive
in this arena, they are more likely to inspire jury nullification than to deter predatory
conduct by males.
VI. CONCLUSION
California Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Traynor once observed that “[t]he
law will never be built in a day, and with luck it will never be finished.”166 His
words are an excellent reminder to us all. We should never treat any legal reform
effort as complete. We should always be looking to see where we are, how we got
there, and where we appear to be going. My purpose in this article has been to ask
those questions in the context of rape law.
In evaluating rape reform, I have tried to be fair-minded and balanced in my
observations. I have suggested areas in which the law should go further to protect
against sexual misconduct, but I have also expressed my belief that rape law reform
threatens to move in undesirable directions. In particular, I have argued that there is
a risk that courts will follow the lead of a few jurisdictions and unrealistically expand
the concept of “force” in rape cases, that we should not take the “absence-of-yesmeans-no” path in criminal law enforcement, and that we should be careful not to
eviscerate the mens rea requirement in rape prosecutions.
Since I believe that rape reform has not gone far enough in certain regards, why
have I chosen to emphasize the areas where I fear we might go too far? The answer,
I guess, has something to do with my tendency to want to intellectually swim
upstream. I have few doubts that advocates for broad expansion of rape law will
continue to be heard in the academy and most legal circles. I fear, however, that our
righteous condemnation of rape might chill constructive debate regarding the proper
direction of future rape law reform. This article is my scholarly effort, I guess, to
call for a little more yin and yang in rape law reform.
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I was unwilling to fully accept the rape/theft equation earlier, see supra text
accompanying notes 99-101, because intercourse is not itself a social harm; in the absence of
force or other misconduct by the male, I believe that the female has as much responsibility to
let her wishes be known as the male has a responsibility to learn what her wishes are. In the
case of fraud, however, the requisite misconduct is present.
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